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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Jared Thompson appeals from the district court's Judgment of 
Conviction. Mr. Thompson asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for involuntary manslaughter, failing to prove that his use of a gun 
caused or produced the death of Mr. Blair. As such, he asserts that this Court must 
vacate his conviction. 
Alternatively, Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to an excessive sentence without giving proper weight and 
consideration to both the circumstances of the crime and the mitigating factors that exist 
in this case. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for a 
reduction of sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Thompson was charged with involuntary manslaughter and a deadly weapon 
enhancement. (R., pp.45-49.) Mr. Thompson entered a not guilty plea and the case 
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.55-56, 118.) 
Ms. Khali Jones testified that on the night in question four individuals, including 
herself, Mr. Thompson (Jared), Mr. Blair (Mike) and Ms. Kull (Kristen), had gone out to a 
couple of local bars and had been drinking. (Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.291, L.23.)1 During the 
1 Citations to the trial transcript will be cited as "Tr." All other transcript citations will 
contain the date of the hearing. 
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evening Mike and Kristen began arguing and this arguing was irritating Jared so he 
decided that the group needed to leave. (Tr., p.295, Ls.8-13.) 
When the group left the bar, Jared was driving, Kristen in the front passenger 
seat, Mike seated behind Jared, and Khali seated behind Kristen. (Tr., p.295, L.14 -
p.296, L.12.) Mike and Kristen continued to argue on the drive home. (Tr., p.296, L.13 
- p.297, L.6.) At some point, Jared stated, "If one of you don't shut up, I'm going to 
shoot somebody," and Khali saw that Jared had a gun in its holster. (Tr., p.297, Ls.9-
12.) In response, Mike just kind of laughed. (Tr., p.297, Ls.13-16.) Jared then stated, 
"You think I'm kidding," removed the gun from its holster and cocked the gun twice. 
(Tr., p.297, Ls.17-21.) Jared then held the gun in his right hand, with his elbow on the 
center console, and pointed the gun up and backwards at an angle. (Tr., p.298, Ls.6-9.) 
Mike then slid halfway over to the middle seat and said, "If you're going to shoot 
somebody, it might as well be me. End my miserable existence," put his hand on 
Jared's hand and his mouth around the barrel of the gun. (Tr., p.300, Ls.18-22.) When 
Khali turned her head the gun went off. (Tr., p.300, L.24 - p.301, L.1.) After the gun 
went off, Mike's head landed in Khali's lap, she shook him to wake him up, thinking it 
was a joke, then she lit up the scene with her phone and saw blood coming out of his 
mouth and nose. (Tr., p.320, Ls.5-11.) Around this time, Jared stated that Mike had 
pulled the trigger. (Tr., p.320, Ls.12-13.) 
The jury found Mr. Thompson guilty of both the involuntary manslaughter charge 
and the use of deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.201-202.) 
At sentencing, the State requested a unified sentence of twenty years, with ten 
years fixed. (Tr. 2/25/13, p.104, Ls.9-11.) Defense counsel requested that the district 
court sentence Mr. Thompson to a five year probationary term. (Tr. 2/25/13, p.116, 
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Ls.116.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed. (R., pp.224-226.) Mr. Thompson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.227-229.) Mr. Thompson also filed a timely Rule 35 
motion. (Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.)2 The motion was denied. (Order Denying 
the Defendant's Motion for Rule 35.) 
2 A motion to augment was filed on 12/20/13. As of the date of the filing of this 
Appellant's Brief, the motion has not yet been ruled upon. 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Thompson's conviction for involuntary manslaughter 
because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Thompson, a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, following his conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter and a weapons enhancement? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Thompson's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Thompson's Conviction For Involuntary Manslaughter 
Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Thompson asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support the jury's guilty verdict. The State failed to present any direct evidence that 
Mr. Thompson caused or produced the death of Mr. Blair. Therefore, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Thompson's conviction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995). 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in 
scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 2008). The appellate court applies 
the same standard when reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828. "For evidence to be substantial, it must 
be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." 
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State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. 
Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 (1996)). This Court does not substitute its view of the 
evidence for that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
the evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, 
the Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. 
Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict 
Finding Mr. Thompson Guilty Of Involuntary Manslaughter 
Mr. Thompson was charged with involuntary manslaughter and a deadly weapon 
enhancement. (R., pp.45-49.) He asserts that the State's evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict and that his conviction must be vacated. 
In this case, the State's relevant evidence was as follows: 3 
Ms. Khali Jones testified that on the night in question four individuals, including 
herself, Mr. Thompson (Jared), Mr. Blair (Mike) and Ms. Kull (Kristen), had gone out to a 
couple of local bars and had been drinking. (Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.291, L.23.) Around 
11 :00 p.m. there was an incident where Kristen went outside with a man identified only 
as the "Mexican." (Tr., p.293, Ls.20-23.) After Khali went outside and brought Kristen 
3 There was testimony presented about the reactions of each of the people in the car 
after the shooting. Each of these individuals acted in a bizarre manner. (Tr. p.262, 
Ls.1- 16, p.320, L.18- p.323, L.14, p.348, L.10- p.351, L.10, 357, L.18 - p.358, L.18, 
p.363, L.10 - p.370, L.22.) Because the actions after do not relate to the questions of 
whether the State supplied sufficient evidence to prove involuntary manslaughter, this 
evidence will not be reviewed in the Appellant's Brief. Further, the State also supplied 
the testimony of the Minidaoka County Coroner and Dr. Graben; because 
Mr. Thompson does not challenge that there was death or the manner of death, this 
testimony will also not be reviewed in the Appellant's Brief. (Tr., p.535, L.7 - p.562, 
L.15.) 
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back inside, Kristen confronted Mike about the "Mexican" because Mike had allegedly 
told the man to take Kristen outside. (Tr., p.294, Ls.4-17.) Mike told Kristen it was just 
a joke, that he would take care of it, and then confronted the man, pulling a knife on him 
to "make sure" that he did not bother them again. (Tr., p.294, L 18 - p.295, L.3.) This 
made Kristen angrier and the two kept arguing. (Tr., p.295, Ls.5-8.) The arguing was 
irritating Jared so he decided that the group needed to leave sometime between 11 :45 
p.m. and midnight. (Tr., p.295, Ls.8-13.) 
After additional arguing, the group finally became situated in the truck with Jared 
driving, Kristen in the front passenger seat, Mike seated behind Jared, and Khali seated 
behind Kristen. (Tr., p.295, L.14 - p.296, L.12.) Mike and Kristen continued to argue 
on the drive home. (Tr., p.296, L.13 - p.297, L.6.) At some point, Jared stated, "If one 
of you don't shut up, I'm going to shoot somebody," and Khali saw that Jared had a gun 
in its holster. (Tr., p.297, Ls.9-12.) In response, Mike just kind of laughed. (Tr., p.297, 
Ls.13-16.) Jared then stated, "You think I'm kidding," removed the gun from its holster 
and cocked the gun twice. (Tr., p.297, Ls.17-21.) Jared then held the gun in his right 
hand, with his elbow on the center console and pointed the gun up and backwards at an 
angle. (Tr., p.298, Ls.6-9.) Mike then slid halfway over to the middle seat and said, "If 
you're going to shoot somebody, it might as well be me. End my miserable existence," 
put his hand on Jared's hand and his mouth around the barrel ofthe gun. (Tr., p.300, 
Ls.18-22.) When Khali turned her head the gun went off. (Tr., p.300, L.24 - p.301, 
L.1.) 
After the gun went off, Mike's head landed in Khali's lap, she shook him to wake 
him up, thinking it was a joke, then she lit up the scene with her phone and saw blood 
coming out of his mouth and nose. (Tr., p.320, Ls.5-11.) Kristen was yelling at Jared to 
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pull over and he stated that he was. (Tr., p.320, Ls.11-12.) Around this time, Jared 
stated that Mike had pulled the trigger. (Tr., p.320, Ls.12-13.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Jones noted that Jared did not point the gun directly 
at anyone and that if the gun had been fired as pointed by Jared, it would not have hit 
Mike. (Tr., p.332, Ls.13-21, p.334, Ls.8-12.) It was only because Mike slid across the 
seat and placed the gun in his mouth that the gun was in a position to fire at him that he 
was hit by a bullet. (Tr., p.334, Ls.3-15.) Ms. Jones stated that she did not see either 
Jared or Mike's finger on the trigger. (Tr., p.334, Ls.16-21.) She also noted that when 
Jared said that, "He (Mike) pulled the trigger," it was in a very surprised and shocked 
tone. (Tr., p.334, L.22 - p.335, L.8.) Later, Ms. Jones discussed that Jared had the 
gun in his hand, that she did not observe Mike having the gun in his hand, but that Mike 
had enough control of the gun to put it in his mouth. (Tr., p.338, L.13 - p.339, L.21.) 
The State also offered the testimony of several officers who noted that 
Mr. Thompson's statements about what occurred that night initially did not match those 
of Ms. Jones, but after asking several questions and providing Mr. Thompson with 
additional information, his version of events was very similar. (See generally Tr., p.393, 
L.1 - p.429, L.5 (Vic Watson), p.438, L.1 - p.528, L.8. (Eric Snarr) Specifically, 
Mr. Thompson stated that "I didn't know his finger was on the trigger. I don't know who 
pulled the trigger." (Tr., p.428, Ls.15-16.) Mr. Thompson thought that maybe his finger 
was on the trigger and Mr. Blair "hit it." (Tr., p.429, Ls.1-2.) He also stated that, "It was 
my mistake." (Tr., p.479, Ls.17-22.) But, Mr. Thompson did note that he wasn't 
expecting Mr. Blair to grab his hand or the gun. (Tr., p.519, Ls.5-6, p.523, L.7-9.) 
The jury was instructed as follows: 
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Instruction No. 10 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter by negligent 
use of a deadly weapon, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about December 16, 2011 and December 17, 2011 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Michael Jared Thompson used a firearm with reckless 
disregard of the rights of others, 
4. producing the death of Michael Kenneth Blair. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., p.187.) 
Instruction No. 1 0a 
The defendant, Michael Jared Thompson, is charged in this case with Involuntary 
Manslaughter. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. In 
charging the Defendant with Involuntary Manslaughter, the State must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) a death occurred, and (2) the defendant unlawfully caused 
that death. 
(R., p.188.) 
Certainly the evidence provides that Mr. Thompson introduced a loaded handgun 
into a situation where multiple individuals had been drinking. However, Mr. Thompson 
maintains that his actions did not cause or produce the death of Mr. Blair. Instead, the 
evidence clearly shows that the death would not have occurred if Mr. Blair had not 
placed the barrel of the gun in his mouth. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see 
also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1996). The State failed to present any 
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evidence, much less substantial and competent evidence, that proved, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Thompson caused or produced the death of Mr. Blair as was 
required for a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Instead, Mr. Thompson asserts 
that Mr. Blair's unfortunate actions of moving over to the middle of the seat, placing his 
hand on Mr. Thompson's hand, and putting the gun into his mouth, amounted to 
intervening circumstances and were the true cause of Mr. Blair's death. 
1. The Element Of Producing Or Causing The Death 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court rearticulated the causations standards. See 
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011 ).4 Corbus stated the following: 
As articulated by this Court in Lampien, causation consists of actual 
cause and true proximate cause. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 
757. "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 
875, 204 P.3d at 515). The "but for" test is used in circumstances where 
there is only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes were 
not acting concurrently. Id. On the other hand, true proximate cause 
deals with "whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would 
flow from the negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 
204 P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly 
unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities 
of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). 
An intervening, superseding cause is "an independent act or force 
that breaks the causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the 
victim's injury." Id. In general, an intervening, superseding cause 
replaces the defendant's act as the proximate cause of the victim's injury. 
Id. at 374-75, 223 P.3d at 757-58. However, to relieve a defendant of 
criminal liability, an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and 
extraordinary occurrence. Id. at 375, 223 P.3d at 758. "The defendant 
remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might 
4 The standards were articulated in regards to restitution, but the law on the subject of 
causation is not altered because of the specific arena it is applied to and, as such, the 
legal standards discussed in Corbus apply to this situation as well. 
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reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have 
foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act." 
Id. 
Id. at 602-603. 
a. Actual Cause 
In this case, the issue of actual cause involves the factual question of whether 
Mr. Blair's death would not have occurred but for Mr. Thompson's criminal conduct. 
Mr. Thompson concedes that Mr. Blair would not have been injured by his handgun if he 
had not introduced the gun into the situation. However, Mr. Thompson asserts that but 
for causation is not the end of the analysis as numerous factors are but for causes of 
Mr. Blair's death including, inviting the group out that night, Mr. Thompson purchasing 
the gun, the birth of both individuals, the invention of firearms, and so on. As such, the 
actual cause or but for causation analysis provides little guidance on the question of 
whether Mr. Thompson caused or produced the death. 
b. Proximate Cause 
In this case, the issue of proximate cause involves the factual question of 
whether Mr. Blair's actions in moving to the center, placing his hand on Mr. Thompson's 
hand or on the gun, putting the barrel of the gun in his mouth, and the gun going off 
resulting the death, were reasonably foreseeable consequences of Mr. Thompson's 
action of introducing a loaded gun into the situation. Mr. Thompson asserts that 
Mr. Blair's actions were not reasonably foreseeable. Certainly, Mr. Thompson created a 
dangerous situation. One can imagine numerous possible harms that could have 
occurred from pulling out a loaded hand gun, i.e. the gun going off if Mr. Thompson hit a 
bump in the road, a struggle over the gun and accidental discharge, or injury by others 
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in the vehicle as they tried to escape the cab and the loaded gun. However, a 
reasonable person in Mr. Thompson's position, when making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm that his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected that a passenger would move themselves to be in front of the gun, attempt to 
control the gun by placing their hand on Mr. Thompson's, and, then the most 
unforeseeable action of all, place the barrel of the gun into their mouth. No individual 
making reasonable decisions, even if the person has been drinking, places themselves 
into further danger by moving into a firearm's path and they undoubtedly do not struggle 
to place a gun into their mouth. As such, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the 
death of Mr. Blair, in such a manner, would flow from the negligent conduct of 
Mr. Thompson. 
C. Intervening Cause 
Mr. Thompson asserts that Mr. Blair's independent, voluntary acts of moving over 
to the center of the back seat, placing his hand over Mr. Thompson's, and putting the 
barrel of the gun in his mouth were intervening, superseding causes of Mr. Blair's death. 
And, that as such, Mr. Thompson is not criminally liable for the death and the State 
failed to meet its burden to prove that he produced or caused the death. Mr. Blair's 
actions were unforeseeable and extraordinary. 
There are many factors to consider when determining whether an intervening act 
is adequate to constitute a superseding cause, including whether (1) the operation or 
the consequences appear to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the 
circumstances; (2) the intervening act is operating independently of any situation 
created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of 
such situation; (3) the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or 
12 
failure to act; (4) the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is 
wrongful toward the other and, as such, subjects the third person to liability to him; and 
(5) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening 
force in motion. Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 329 (1966) (citing Restatement of Torts 
2d, § 442). 
In this case, because the intervening, superseding cause involves the conduct of 
the victim rather than some third-party actor or force, the analysis is effectively the same 
as for determining whether Mr. Thompson's actions were the proximate cause of 
Mr. Blair's death. As discussed above, it was not reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Blair 
would be killed by a fatal firing of the gun in the mouth of Mr. Blair when Mr. Thompson 
introduced a loaded gun to the situation and pointed it towards the top, back of the 
truck's cabin. Simply, Mr. Blair's death was an extraordinary consequence of 
Mr. Thompson's actions. Mr. Blair's actions were independent of the situation that 
Mr. Thompson created and were not a reasonable or foreseeable response to the 
danger created by Mr. Thompson's conduct. Mr. Blair's placing the barrel of the gun 
into his mouth was in no way a reasonable reaction to the situation. Therefore, 
Mr. Blair's actions amount to an intervening cause in this case sufficient to relieve 
Mr. Thompson of liability for Mr. Blair's death and, as such, the State failed to prove that 
Mr. Thompson caused or produced the death. 
D. This Court Must Vacate Mr. Thompson's Conviction 
Mr. Thompson admittedly made a major judgment error by introducing a loaded 
firearm to the situation. However, the death of Mr. Blair was not caused or produced by 
Mr. Thompson. While his actions may be one of hundreds of but for causes and were 
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certainly directly related to the death, the intervening and unforeseeable actions of 
Mr. Blair were the true cause of the death and the State failed to prove otherwise. 
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Thompson 
committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter, specifically, that his conduct produced 
or caused the death, this Court must vacate his conviction. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Thompson, A 
Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For 
Involuntary Manslaughter And A Weapons Enhancement 
Mr. Thompson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Thompson does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Thompson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 
121 Idaho 385 (1992))). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: 
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(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
(quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001))). 
Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight or 
consideration to the circumstances of the crime and the mitigating factors that exist in 
this case. Mr. Thompson was a twenty-four-year-old young man when the instant 
offense occurred. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) While he 
is not perfect, he has been a contributing member of society, a loving father, and a good 
person, who made a tragic mistake when he pulled out a loaded gun, inserting into a 
situation which spiraled out of control when Mr. Blair positioned himself in front of the 
gun, grabbed it, and placed it in his mouth. No matter how tragic the loss of Mr. Blair, 
the district court had a duty to consider not only Mr. Thompson's criminal capability, but 
who he was as an individual in determining an appropriate sentence. The district court 
abused its sentencing discretion when it placed the tragic death and its immeasurable 
impact on the victim's family over the true goals of sentencing. 
The death of Mr. Blair was tragic, isolated, and likely un-recreatable. Other than 
this series of unfortunate events, there has been little in Mr. Thompson's life that 
required society be protected from him. Mr. Thompson has a limited criminal history 
including one juvenile conviction, two alcohol related misdemeanors, and a few 
infractions. (PSI, p.9; Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
APSI) 1/15/13, pp.1-2.) This is hardly a criminal record that requires imposition of a 
prison sentence to protect society. In fact, a probationary term would be all that was 
necessary to insure that Mr. Thompson was following regulations prohibiting him from 
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possessing firearms, was maintaining employment, and was continuing to contribute to 
society in a meaningful way. As such, the imposed sentence is excessive for the 
purposes of protecting society. 
Everyone can agree that inserting a loaded weapon into a situation where young 
adults are drinking is more that undesirable. However, a fifteen year prison sentence in 
not necessary for deterrence. Certainly, if a similar situation were to occur again, it 
would be the death of a friend or young man in general that would deter individuals from 
making such reckless decisions, not a fear of the prison sentence such behavior may 
carry. Again, this situation was bizarre and very unlikely to reoccur. As such, 
deterrence is not a goal that can be as easily accomplished as a direct result of the 
imposition of sentence. 
It is difficult to see how rehabilitation comes into play in this crime. Certainly, 
Mr. Thompson would benefit from abstaining from alcohol in the future because of its 
effect on his decision making. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Thompson has 
an alcohol dependence issue. Additionally, Mr. Thompson may benefit from additional 
gun safety training if he is ever able to possess a firearm again in the future. These 
could both be accomplished easily if Mr. Thompson was in the community on probation 
and a period of incarceration is not necessary for his rehabilitation. 
As such, it appears that the factor given the most weight by the district court was 
punishment for wrongdoing. The district court did not give proper weight and 
consideration to Mr. Thompson's limited role in the death of Mr. Blair. Certainly, the 
accidental death of Mr. Blair is a horrible and avoidable tragedy. However, 
Mr. Thompson asserts that while his actions contributed to the situation that ultimately 
resulted in the death, his actions were not the direct cause of Mr. Blair's untimely 
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demise. Argument regarding the limited role that Mr. Thompson played Mr. Blair's 
death was presented in Issue I and is incorporated herein by reference. Assuming 
arguendo that this Court upholds Mr. Thompson's verdicts, he asserts that to the extent 
he is criminally culpable, his actions alone did not result in the death and that without 
the reckless actions of the victim, Mr. Blair would not have suffered the fatal injury. 
Mr. Thompson must be punished as a result of his conviction, but that sentence should 
match his criminal culpability. While his choices were inappropriate, imposing a fifteen 
year prison sentence upon Mr. Thompson when it took the inappropriate choices of both 
himself and Mr. Blair in order to have the tragic result that occurred is an abuse of 
discretion. 
Additionally, Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court failed to give proper 
weight or consideration to the additional mitigating factors that occurred in this case. 
Mr. Thompson has taken responsibility for his actions. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 
204 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light 
of Alberts' expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his 
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. at 204. 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Thompson apologized for his involvement in the tragic 
events of night Mr. Blair was killed stating, ''I'd just like to apologize to you guys for the 
loss of Mike and my contribution to that. I understand that you won't forgive me, and I 
just want you to know that I am truly sorry. You Honor, I take full responsibility for my 
actions ... " (Tr. 2/25/13, p.118, Ls.5-10.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Thompson has two small children, ages five and three at the 
time of sentencing. (PSI, p.11.) Both of his boys were born while Mr. Thompson was 
married to his then wife. (PSI, p.11.) At time of the sentencing, Mr. Thompson had joint 
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custody of his children, seeing them five days a week. (PSI, p.11.) He noted that the 
most important thing in his life are his children and his current goals are making sure 
that his children are provided for and staying away from bad influences to insure that 
occurs. (PSI, p.14.) 
Mr. Thompson is a contributing member of society. He was not only a high 
school graduate, but graduated from a specialized training program in New Jersey 
where he trained to be an underwater welder. (PSI, p.11; APSI attachment, letter from 
Rick and Zena Thompson.) He has been employed off and on since 2005 working in 
the specialized field of welding. (PSI, p.12.) His employers both noted that 
Mr. Thompson was a good worker and would be eligible for rehire. (PSI, p.12.) 
Mr. Thompson noted that he has never had an issue holding down employment and has 
never been fired. (PSI, p.12.) 
Additionally, Mr. Thompson has the support of his family. In State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend 
support were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to what is an 
appropriate sentence. Id. His parents, Rick and Zena Thompson wrote a letter of 
support for their son. (APSI attachment, letter from Rick and Zena Thompson.) They 
noted that: 
[Jared] is a hard worker and takes pride in what he does. He is 
smart and a thinker . . . He loves being a dad and is a very good dad to 
his two boys. He makes sure they do things together when he is not 
working. He loves the outdoors and spends a lot of time outside, 4-
wheeling, snowboarding, camping, etc. Jared's boys also have a love for 
the outdoors and [love] being with their father outdoors .... 
We believe this tragic accident was a huge wake up call for Jared. 
He realized that drinking was not doing anything good for him ... 
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Jared is a good person with a good heart and so much to offer 
society. He has always been very respectful of others as well as his 
family. He has held down a job for the entire time he has been out of jail. 
People and his family love him and he is great with the public. He pays 
his bills and takes care of his own .... 
It was a horrible, tragic accident that happened because of a series 
of bad choices on his and the other person's part with alcohol being a big 
contributing factor to both of them that resulted in their bad choices. . .. 
This incident was a very tragic accident that Jared will have to live with for 
the rest of his life. I know that he learned a very valuable lesson and one 
he certainly won't repeat. It was a costly mistake and lack of good 
judgment especially being under the bad influence of alcohol. Jared 
thinks of this tragic accident everyday. 
(APSI attachment, letter from Rick and Zena Thompson.) 
As such, Mr. Thompson asserts that when considering the objectives of 
sentencing, his criminal culpability, and the mitigating factors present in this case, the 
district court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Thompson's Rule 35 
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) 
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). "If the 
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is 
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for 
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reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)). "When 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court should have reduced his sentence 
based upon the new or additional information he provided. Mr. Thompson asserted that 
his sentence was inappropriately harsh and inappropriately excessive in light of the 
sentence pronounced in a similar and recent case. (Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.) 
Mr. Thompson attached an article from the Idaho Statesman website which discussed 
Gregory Shain's sentence (ten years of probation) in an Ada County accidental shooting 
case which resulted in the death of the victim. (Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.) The 
article reported that Mr. Shain pointed a gun at his friend, put the gun in his friend's 
mouth, and pulled the trigger, all at the request of his friend, the victim, Mr. Arlen. 
(Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.) Mr. Shain did not know that the gun had been re-
loaded by Mr. Arlen earlier in the evening. (Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.) 
Mr. Thompson concedes that the facts of the cases are not identical and that 
both cases have different mitigating and aggravating facts, notably: Mr. Shain did not 
know the gun was loaded. Mr. Thompson loaded the gun in the case at hand. 
Mr. Shain pointed the gun, put it in his friend's mouth and pulled the trigger. 
Mr. Thompson pointed the gun towards the back ceiling of his truck, not aiming it at any 
person. Mr. Blair moved over, grabbed at the gun, placed the gun in his mouth, and it is 
unclear who pulled the trigger or how the gun went off. Yet, in both cases, it was clear 
that the shooting of a friend was not intended and was nothing more than a horrible 
accident. 
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Mr. Shain received a much less sever sentence, a ten year probationary term. 
(Augmentation: Motion for Rule 35.) Mr. Thompson asserts that the sentence 
discussed in this article is far more appropriate based on the actual criminal culpability 
of the defendants in each case. As such, he asserts that this article illustrates, that by 
comparison, the sentence imposed in his case is a highly excessive sentence that does 
meet the objectives of sentencing. 
Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court should have reduced his sentence 
based upon the new information provided and the mitigating information available at the 
original sentencing, articulated in Issue II and incorporated herein by reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thompson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and 
conviction because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2013. 
/~/4 ;t: 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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